Models of observational learning in settings of sequential choice have two key features. The first is that players make decisions by using Bayes' rule to update their beliefs about payoffs from a common prior. The second is that each agent's decision rule is common knowledge, so that subsequent players can draw inferences about unobserved private signals from observable actions. In this paper, I relax the first assumption while maintaining the second. In particular, I look at observational learning by players who choose among actions using nonparametric methods for estimating payoffs. When players are identical and learn according to the maximum score method, an informational cascade must result. If players of different types with respect to payoffs use kernel or nearest neighbor learning rules, there are cases in which neither a herd nor a cascade need arise. If a cascade does occur, it must be one in which all players, regardless of type, choose the same action. In some situations, these alternative learning rules actually perform better than Bayesian updating.
Introduction
An infinite number of players must choose, one at a time and in an exogenously specified order, among a set of actions. None of the players know what the payoffs to the various actions are, but before deciding on an action each of them receives a noisy signal about which one is optimal. A player cannot observe the signals of the other players, but he can observe the choices that earlier players made, which may indirectly reveal something about the value of their signals. In a process of observational learning, players combine the information available from those two sources to estimate which action is likely to give the highest payoff.
A prominent feature of these models of sequential choice is that full learning may not occur, in the sense that players may never know for certain what the optimal action or actions are. That failure may occur even when the cumulative information contained in the players' signals is sufficient to identify the best choice. The difficulty is that each player is concerned only with maximizing his own immediate payoff, and not with revealing information that could be helpful to future players. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) introduce the idea of an informational cascade, in which at some point players base their choices only on the information revealed by the choices of earlier players, and ignore their own signals. Once a cascade begins, subsequent players' choices reveal nothing about their private signals, so no further public learning takes place. In choosing their actions, players do not take into account the value to future players of revealing their signals. This informational inefficiency often leads to less learning than socially optimal.
Two papers, Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992) , separately introduce such models; Smith and Sorensen (2000) generalize their results. All three papers analyze the process of observational learning by rational agents who share prior beliefs over the payoffs of different action, who know the distributions over private signals conditional on the realized payoff values, and who update their beliefs about which action is optimal according to Bayes' rule, using the information from their private signals and the actions of previous players. In particular, they look at the conditions under which either informational cascades or herds arise; a herd, which is related to a cascade, begins when all future players choose the same action. If there are different types of players, a herd is when all players of the same type begin to choose the same action. That kind of behavior, of course, may not look like the typical image of a herd, because different choices are made by players with different characteristics.
There are two key features of models of social learning. The first is that players make decisions by using Bayes' rule to update their beliefs about payoffs from a common prior. The second is that each agent's decision rule is common knowledge, so that subsequent players can draw inferences about unobserved private signals from observable actions. In this paper, I relax the first assumption while maintaining the second. In particular, I look at observational learning by players who are not Bayesian expected utility maximizers, either because they are boundedly rational or because they lack the probabilistic information about the structure of the payoffs necessary to use Bayes' rule.
In particular, the players know neither the values of payoffs nor the distributions of private signals, and in fact do even have beliefs about them. In such a setting, Bayesian learning is clearly impossible, so I consider alternative learning rules. Among the many such alternative rules, I focus on ones based on nonparametric techniques, for two reasons. First, procedures actually used by econometricians presumably represent the best available methods for the practical estimation of unknown parameters from data. In the case of sequential choice, the unknown parameter for each player is the identity of the payoff-maximizing action. Second, nonparametric methods, which require the weakest assumptions about the data-ge nerating process, provide the greatest contrast with Bayesian decision making based on a common prior, where the form of the payoff function and the distributions of signals conditional on the state are common knowledge.
I continue to assume that players know each others' decision rules, in order to preserve the flavor of observational learning, where agents acquire information by reasoning backwards from actions to signals.
I consider both the case where the respective payoffs from different actions are the same for all players (the identical agent case) and the case where payoffs depend on players' types, which are drawn from a continuous set and are publicly observable.
When the players are all identical, they are modeled as forming their estimates of payoffs using the method of maximum score estimation. In the Bayesian setting, the extension to multiple types makes little difference. Since players know the relationship between types and payoffs for each possible state of the world, the signals received by players of different types can still be used to update beliefs about the state. When players are ignorant (in the sense of not having prior distributions over possible payoffs), adding types introduces a second source of uncertainty. Not only do players not know which action is optimal for them, they also do not know how payoffs vary with types, so using the signals of other players to learn about their own optimal actions becomes more difficult. If there were a finite set of possible types, then players could look only at the experiences of players of their own type, using the maximum score rule. With a continuous type space, the probability of observing two players with the exact same type is zero, so something must be added to the learning rule. Kernel and nearest neighbor smoothing methods extend the maximum score rule to allow players to use information from players of similar types.
An example of sequential choice by players of different types is high school seniors deciding between attending college and entering the workforce. Each student has private information in the form of financial aid offers from different colleges, and she also has information about which options were chosen by older siblings or by members of previous classes. Of course, not all high school seniors are alike, so the best choice for one student is not necessarily the best choice for another. In particular, a student's success in college may depend on her SAT score (her type). To make a decision, the student must determine how to weight her private signal against the choices made by previous students, who may have had different abilities. Similar situations occur when individuals must choose among careers, retirement plans, or automobiles.
The aim of this paper is to answer two questions about the observational learning that results when players use the nonparametric learning rules. The first is whether or not the herds and cascades that characterize Bayesian observational learning still arise. The second is whether or not it is possible for the nonparametric rules to perform "better" than Bayesian updating, even though the nonparametric rules use less information. There are two senses in which one learning rule can do better than another. First, it might be more likely to reveal the optimal action when all players use it. Second, it might give the players a higher eventual expected payoff. A rule that does better according to the first criterion is not necessarily superior with respect to the second, because the consequences of choosing a sub-optimal action may be different for different realizations of payoffs.
The rule most likely to identify the optimal action does not necessarily maximize social welfare. For a given amount of information, a player using the nonparametric rules makes a suboptimal choice compared to a Bayesian player, so the Bayesian rule tends to do better. On the other hand, the nonparametric rules may generate greater public learning, so that the non-Bayesian players have more information to work with. In that case, the nonparametric rules may perform better. Of course, the nonparametric rules may also lead to less public learning, so that the Bayesian rules are unambiguously superior.
When players are identical and learn according to the maximum score method, I
show that a cascade must result. If players of different types use kernel or nearest neighbor learning rules, there are cases in which neither a herd nor a cascade need arise.
If a cascade does occur, it must be one in which all players, regardless of type, choose the same action. In some situations, these alternative learning rules actually perform better than Bayesian updating, in both senses. That is, there are examples of sequential choice settings where the eventual expected payoff for all players is higher when they all use the alternative rule, even though each individual player may be choosing sub-optimally compared to a Bayesian, and there are also examples where the eventual herd is more likely to be on the correct action than in the Bayesian case.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, I present the model of sequential choice. The analytic results for the model with homogeneous agents and heterogeneous agents, respectively, are given in Sections 3 and 4, and I conclude in Section 3.5.
Model
Consider the following sequential learning game: There is an infinite sequence of players, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, … }. The players are of different types. Player i's type, X i , is drawn randomly from a continuous distribution P X whose support is the closed interval [−1, 1]. Each player's type is chosen independently of the other players' types and is observed by all players.
Starting with Player 1, each player in order is faced with a choice between two actions, A1 and A2. The payoff to choosing each action depends on the state of the world, ω, which is chosen by nature before the first player's move and is not observed.
The state ω is drawn from a finite set Ω according to the distribution P ω ; no two states yield the same payoffs. Player i's payoffs may also vary with his type, X i . That is, the payoff to Player i of playing action A ∈ {A1, A2} is given by the function U(A, X i , ω). If a player does not know what the state of the world is, she may not know which action is optimal. Assume that for a set of player types with positive measure, the optimal action differs with the state. Without that assumption, no player has any need to learn the state. Before choosing an action, each player receives a private signal, s i ∈ R, which cannot be observed by the other players. The value of the signal is given by (2.1)
where e i is a noise term drawn independently for each player from the distribution P e (ω), which may vary with the state but which is the same for all players. The distributions P e (ω) are assumed to be such that the induced distributions over s are different in each state; that is, the signals are informative. In the absence of noise, the signal would tell each player which action to choose: Action A1 gives the higher payoff if and only if s i > 0.
Consider the example of the high school senio rs, who want to choose between college and work on the basis of maximizing lifetime income. There, a student's type is his SAT score. His private signal is the financial aid offers from colleges, which he can combine with publicly available information about expected earnings in different careers to form an estimate of the difference in earnings between his two options, as in Equation 2.1. Another example is patients suffering from a disease who must decide whether or not to switch from a traditional treatment to an experimental new drug. A patient's type might be the probability that the traditional treatment will be successful for her. Her private signal, observed after a brief trial of the new drug, is the estimated difference in effectiveness between the two treatments.
In addition to his own signal, Player i observes the period-i history, H i , of the types and action choices (but not the signals) of all previous players. A decision rule for
, A2} from his available information to the action choice that he believes to be optimal; if his information makes him indifferent between the two actions, then as a "tiebreaker" he will choose based only on his private signal. If
Player i knows the decision rules used by other players, as will be assumed throughout, he may be able to infer the value of a previous player's signal, or at least a range of When a player can indirectly observe previous signals, it may be the case that no realization of his private signal will be enough to overturn the belief he has formed from the prior signals about which action has the prior expected payoff, so that he will choose the same action regardless of his signal. That is, it may be that Player i inferred. Thus, Player i + 1 will choose the same action as Player i, regardless of his signal. Smith and Sorensen (2000) show in the corollary to their Lemma 3 that when agents are homogeneous, for a broad class of distributions P e (ω) a herd occurs with probability one. They do not consider heterogeneous agents whose types are observable, but their analysis of the homogeneous agents extends directly to that case and yields the same result. They also show by example that in the absence of perfectly revealing signals, cascades may never arise. The questions of how and whether herds and cascades occur when agents, ignorant of the distributions of states and signals, use alternative decision rules are examined in the next two sections.
Homogeneous Agents
Suppose for a moment that an agent, before making his choice, does not observe the actions of previous players but does receive N independent signals. That is, he Manski's (1975 Manski's ( , 1985 maximum score method for estimating the sign of U(A1, ω) − U(A2, ω). If the median of the noise distribution P e (ω) in each state is zero, then the maximum score method is a consistent estimator of the sign but not the magnitude of U(A1, ω) − U(A2, ω). The advantage of the maximum score method is that it requires only the relatively weak assumption that the noise term has median zero to identify the sign of the payoff difference, given a large enough number of observations. Using the maximum score method means that players are throwing out some of the information in their signals by not considering their magnitudes as well as their signs. The reason is that without additional assumptions about the distributions of the noise terms, the magnitudes are uninformative. A consequence is that the notion of a "s ignal" can be broader than that of Thus, if the first two players get signals with the same sign, a cascade and herd begin on the corresponding action. More generally, a cascade starts as soon as two more players get signals of one sign than get signals of the other, which leads to Proposition 3.1. Let α 1 be the probability that s > 0 conditional on the event that U(A1, ω) > U(A2, ω), and let α 2 be the probability that s < 0 conditional on the event that U(A1, ω) < U(A2, ω). The probabilities α 1 and α 2 are the probabilities of getting the "right" signal when the optimal actions are A1 and A2, respectively.
Proposition 3.1. In the homogeneous agent case, when players use the maximum score decision rule, a cascade occurs with probability one. In the event that the optimal action is Ak (k ∈ {1, 2}) and 0 < α k < 1, the probability that the cascade is on the correct action Sorensen (2000) show by example that a herd does not necessarily imply a cascade, although the converse does hold.
One way to interpret Proposition 3.1 is that players using the maximum score decision rule behave exactly like Bayesian players in the following situation: There are two states of the world, ω 1 and ω 2 , each of which has probability 0.5. In state ω 1 , the payoff to action A1 is 1, and the payoff to action A2 is −1. In state ω 2 , the payoffs are reversed: U(A1, ω 2 ) = −1, and U(A2, ω 2 ) = 1. The noise distributions P e (ω) are such that the support of the signal s is the same in both states. For any s > 0 in the support of the signal distribution, the likelihood ratio P e (ω 1 )(s) / P e (ω 2 )(s) is α /(1 − α), where 0.5 < α < 1. For any s < 0, P e (ω 1 )(s) / P e (ω 2 )(s) = (1 − α)/α. That is, a positive signal is more likely when A1 is the optimal action, a negative signal is more likely when A2 is optimal, and all signals are equally informative. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) analyze that situation in their paper introducing the concept of informational cascades. They show in their Proposition 1 that a cascade occurs almost surely, and that with positive probability the cascade will be on the wrong action.
The proceeding paragraph does not imply, of course, that players using the maximum score decision rule behave in the same way as Bayesian players, given the actual distributions over states and signals and given the payoff functions U. By using the maximum score rule rather than following Bayes' rule, individual players may not be maximizing their expected utility. However, in some cases the expected payoff of all players in the long run (that is, after a herd begins) is actually higher when they use the maximum score rule, as the following example shows.
Example 3.1. Suppose that there are two states of the world, ω 1 and ω 2 . State ω 1 occurs with probability 0.51, and state ω 1 occurs with probability 0.49. In state ω 1 , the payoff to action A1 is 1, and the payoff to action A2 is 0. In state ω 2 , the payoffs are reversed.
There are two possible signals, s1 > 0 and s2 < 0. The probability of signal s1 when the state is ω 1 is 0.6, which is also the probability of signal s2 when the state is ω 2 . When players use Bayesian updating, the probability of a cascade on the right action is 15/19 when the state is ω 1 and 9/19 when the state is ω 2 : Because the prior probability of state ω 1 is greater than the prior probability of ω 2 and the signals are equally informative, a player will choose action A2 whenever the number of s1 signals observed is greater than If players use the maximum score rule, Proposition 3.1 shows that a cascade occurs on the right action with probability 9/13 in either state.
The ex ante probability of a cascade on the optimal action (which is also the ex ante expected payoff once a cascade begins) when players use Bayesian updating is thus (0.51 × 15/19) + (0.49 × 9/19) = 1206/1900 ≈ 0.63. When they use the maximum score rule, it is 9/13 ≈ 0.69.
There are two things to note about Example 3.1. First, there is nothing special about the value 0.6. The maximum score rule performs better whenever the probability of a correct signal is greater than 0.51. Second, it is easy to come up with examples where the maximum score method is m ore likely to lead to a cascade on the correct action. If the payoff difference between actions is greater in one state than in another, Bayesian players will tend to "favor" that state over the other in order to maximize expected utility, in the sense that they may choose that state's optimal action even if that state is not the most likely. For example, suppose that in state ω 1 actions A1 and A2 give payoffs 100 and 0, respectively, and that in state ω 2 they give 0 and 1. Then action A1
(the optimal action in state ω 1 ) gives higher expected utility whenever the probability of state ω 1 is greater than 1/101. The maximum score rule, which considers only the sign of payoff differences, does not have the same bias. Example 3.1, though, is a stronger result. Not only does the maximum score decision rule result in a correct cascade with higher likelihood, but it also yields a greater expected payoff once the cascade begins.
Of course, there are also situations where the maximum score rule performs worse than Bayesian updating. If, for example, private signals are always positive, then the maximum score rule will always result in a cascade on action A1, regardless of which action is optimal. A more interesting example may be to look at a case where the median signal value is zero, so that the maximum score method is a consistent estimator, but it still less likely to lead to the right action. That could happen, for example, if the signals are always even integers in one state and odd integers in the other. Then Bayesian updating always leads to a herd on the optimal action, but the maximum score rule results in a cascade on the wrong action with positive probability. Similar examples can be constructed using signals that are not perfectly informative, as they are in this case.
Heterogeneous Agents
When agents are of different types, the action that is optimal for Player i may not be the right choice for Player i + 1. With Bayesian players whose types are observable, that distinction has little effect on learning. A player's action may still reveal her signal, and that signal may still be informative about the state of the world. The key assumption that allows Bayesian learning to take place is that all types' payoffs depend on the state in a way that is common knowledge -the players know the payoff functions U(A, X, ω).
That kind of knowledge is missing (or at least not used) when players follow the maximum score decision rule. The issue in trying to extend the maximum score rule to the case of heterogeneous agents, then, is how a player should use information about other types' payoffs when the function linking types and payoffs is unknown. Two approaches used by econometricians are kernel methods and nearest neighbor methods.
Both are types of smoothing methods, which require, in addition to the assumption that the median of the noise terms is zero, only that the payoff functions U(A, X, ω) be continuous in the type X in all states of the world.
4.A. Kernel Methods
In kernel regression, the estimated value of a function f evaluated at X 0 is the weighted average of the observed values of the function evaluated at nearby values of X;
those observations may include noise. That is, the predicted value of f(X 0 ), 
where N is the number of signals whose signs are known to the estimating player, s i is Player i's private signal, and sgn(⋅) is the function that takes on the value 1 when its argument is greater than or equal to zero and the value −1 otherwise. One common type of kernel is the rectangular kernel, which gives equal weight to all observations within a certain distance d* (known as the bandwidth) of X 0 and zero weight to observations farther away. That is,
One way to interpret the bandwidth (which can be generalized to other types of kernels)
is as a measure of how similar a type must be to a player's own type to be considered part of his reference group. Note that if players use a rectangular kernel with bandwidth 2 or greater, the resulting behavior is just the same as if they were homogeneous agents using the maximum score rule -players give every type's signal the same weight they give their own.
Suppose that the players use a rectangular kernel with bandwidth d < 2.
Remember that the players' types {X 1 , X 2 , … } have been drawn independently from the distribution P X , which has support [−1, 1]. Player 1 will choose action A1 if his signal s 1 is positive and A2 if it is negative, thus revealing the sign of s 1 through his action. Player 22 opposite signs, so that ) ( 2 X D = 0, the tiebreaking rule leads her to obey her own signal.
Player 3, on the other hand, may disregard his signal, depending on the signs of s 1 and s 2 and on how close his type is to the types of the previous players. If both s 1 and s 2 are positive, for example, and if type X 3 is within d of both X 1 and X 2 , then the kernel decision rule tells Player 3 to play action A1 regardless of the sign of his own signal. If the signals s 1 and s 2 have different signs, though, or if either X 1 or X 2 is farther than d from X 3 , then Player 3 will follow his own signal. Whether or not he does (that is, whethe r or not his action reveals the sign of his signal) is known to subsequent players.
The same kind of analysis applies to all later players.
Suppose The rectangular kernel with bandwidth d decision rule tells every subsequent player, regardless of her type and signal, to play A1. The same kind of result can occur with a wide range of different kernels, leading to Proposition 4.3. Let α 1 (X) be the probability that s > 0 conditional on the event that action A1 is optimal (U(A1, X, ω) > U(A2, X, ω)), and let α 2 (X) be the probability that s < 0 cond itional on action A2 being optimal (U(A1, X, ω) ). The set of types X for which α 1 (X) > 0 is X(A1); X(A2) is the set of types for which α 2 (X) > 0; those types are the ones who may receive "correct" signals. In the Bayesian case, for example, it may be common knowledge that in every state of the world the optimal action for players of type less than zero is different from the optimal action for players of the other types. Then in a cascade all the players with negative types will play one action, and the rest of the players will play the other. However, when players use the kernel decision rule, cascades of that type arise with probability zero. Proof: Let the kernel used by the players be given. Suppose the history is such that there is a type of player X1 that will choose action A1 regardless of his private signal, and a type X2 that choose action A2 regardless of her signal.
when the player's private signal is positive, and define
analogously.
Then it must be the case that
< 0. Now consider a player of type λX1 + (1 − λ)X2, λ ∈ (0, 1). As the value of λ increases from 0 to 1, there must be a point X 0 = λ 0 X1 + (1 − λ 0 )X2 at which )
(except in the probability zero event that the history contains either two observations of the same type, or two observations that are exactly 2d*(w) apart, where
for all types X ∈ (X 0 , X 0 + ε ). All players with types in the range (X 0 , X 0 + ε ) will thus follow their private signals, so a cascade has not occurred. <
Together, Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 show that only a cascade in which players of all types choose the same action can arise, and that, subject to a condition on the distribution of signals, such a cascade occurs with positive probability. Proposition 4.5
states that even when that condition is satisfied, a cascade need not arise. Given a c > 0, let X(c, +, ω) be the set of types X for which the probability that s > 0 is greater than c in state of the world ω, and let X(c, −, ω) be the set of types X for which the probability that s < 0 is greater than c in state ω. Proof: A necessary condition for a player whose type X 0 is near enough to the midpoint of interval I 1 to choose action A2 regardless of his private signal is that the weighted average of the signs of observed signals within d* of X 0 be negative. Because the probability of a negative signal is less than 0.5 for all types lying within I 1 , the probability that their weighted average is ever negative is strictly less than one. Similarly, the probability that a player whose type is close to the midpoint of interval I 2 will ever choose action A1 without regard to her own signal is less than one. If neither event occurs, a cascade cannot arise. < Just as in the case of homogeneous agents, heterogeneous agents can sometimes achieve a higher expected payoff if they all use a kernel decision rule than if they use Bayesian updating. Example 3.1 can be extended to the heterogeneous case -simply assume that in both states the same action is optimal for all types of players. But now there is a second way in which the kernel rule can be more likely to identify the optimal action. A player using a kernel with a small bandwidth will follow her own signal and thus reveal its sign whenever previous players have been too far away in type. A Bayesian player, on the other hand, may be better able to extract information about his own payoffs from the signals of dissimilar players and therefore is less likely to follow his signal, which limits the information available to subsequent players. For example, if
Bayesian players know that in each state the optimal action for all player types is the same, then if the first few players receive "bad" signals, a cascade can start on the wrong action. Players using the kernel method in the same situation, on the other hand, may still follow their own signals if the types of the first few players are sufficiently distant, so an incorrect cascade need not arise. Again as in the homogeneous case, it is also possible for players using the kernel rule to get lower average payoffs than Bayesian players, as the additional prior information used by Bayesians may help them make better choices.
4.B. Nearest Neighbor Methods
Nearest neighbor methods are a variation on kernel estimation. In nearest neighbor estimation, the kernel used in Equation 4.3 gives positive weight only to the p percent (rounded down to the nearest whole number) of observations that lie closest to type X 0 , for p ∈ (0, 1). In the sequential choice model, the nearest neighbor decision rule is somewhat different from the kernel rules discussed in the previous section in that the weighting function used in nearest neighbor estimation depends on relative as well as absolute distance, and that different players use different kernels. Nevertheless, all of the results in Section 4.A also apply to players using the nearest neighbor rule; the proofs are almost identical and are omitted. An additional result, presented in Proposition 4.6, can be proven for the class of nearest neighbor rules that among the closest p percent of observations give the same weight w ∈ (0, 1] to those a positive distance from X 0 and weight 1 to the observation at X 0 . Proposition 4.6 places a lower bound on the probability that a cascade will arise. Recall that given c > 0, X(c, +, ω) is the set of types X for which the probability that s > 0 is greater than c in state of the world ω, and X(c, −, ω) is the set of types X for which the probability that s < 0 is greater than c in state ω. Let m c (A1, ω) be the probability according to the distribution of types P X of drawing a type within X(c, +, ω), and let m c (A2, ω) be the probability that a type lies within X(c, −, ω). 
Conclusion
Previous work on observational learning has assumed fully rational agents who form their beliefs about which action is optimal according to Bayes' rule. (Exceptions are Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and Manski (1993 Manski ( , 2001 .) This paper relaxes that assumption and looks at boundedly rational (or fully rational but ignorant) players who use alternative learning rules based on nonparametric techniques. The Bayesian observational learning phenomena of herds and cascades also occur when players use the econometric decision rules, as long as the fact that all players use that rule is common knowledge. A possible extension of the model would be to relax the assumption that each player uses a commonly known decision rule, and instead to assume only that each chooses from among a set of possible rules. For example, agents might all use kernel rules, but with different bandwidths. That would reduce the amount of information revealed by players' actions, but herds and cascades might still result.
Aside from cons idering classes of learning rules, one way to enrich the model of sequential choice is to allow the types of players to vary across multiple dimensions, rather than just one. One high school senior, for example, may have better SAT scores than another, while the second has better grades and more extracurricular activities than the first.
Finally, another interesting extension would be to examine the result if groups of players made their decisions at the same time. The model examined here, like the standard model in Smith and Sorensen (2000) , assumes that players make their decisions one at a time. In some contexts, it is more realistic to model them as choosing in cohorts of N players, where Players 1 through N decide simultaneously, followed by Players N + 1 through 2N, and so on. Each member of a cohort would observe the same history, but each would have his own private signal. The example of college choice discussed previously is probably more accurately modeled in that way. Alternatively, the players could be modeled as having private signals that were observable within the cohort but not to members of other cohorts. If we assume that people go out to eat in groups and that they can communicate with each other, then Banerjee's (1992) example of herding, in which diners must choose between two restaurants, fits that model of cohort learning.
